Monetary restraint and inflationary momentum by anonymous
I HE ECONOMY is showing the continuing effects
of the policies of monetary and fiscal restraint ac-
twely pursued during the past year. The rate of
growth of total spending has slowed since last sum-
mer, real product has declined slightly, and indus-
trial production has fallen moderately. Employment
growth has slackened and unemployment has in-
creased. The primary goal of reduced inflation has
not yet been achieved, however, as upward pressure
accumulated over the past five years continues to be
a powerful influence on current prices. The rate of
price increase can be expected to moderate only
after the reduced pace of spending and of real eco-
nomic activity begins to overcome the momentum of
inflation.
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Excessive growth of total spending from 1964 to
1968, fostered by expansive monetary and fiscal ac-
tions, resulted in ever-mounting pressure on prices.
The response of production to growth of demand for
goods and services is limited by the productive capac-
ity of the economy Production can be expanded by
employment of more resources, but as the economy
approaches full employment, increasingly less effi-
cient resources are employed, increases in production
become more difficult and upward pressure on prices
intensifies.
From 1964 to late 1968, total spending increased at
an average 8 per cent rate, while production capacity
increased at about a 4 per cent rate. During the early
part of the period the economy had resources which
could he tapped and consequently production could
be increased to meet most of the sudden increase in
demand, with little upward pressure on prices. As
the unused resources were employed, however, growth
of production ~~•~as constrained and price increases
accelerated, Prices rose at a 3 per cent rate from 1965
to mid-1967, a4per cent rate from mid-1967 through
1968, and a 5 per cent rate in 1969.
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closely related to the rapid monetary expansion,
which was apparently undertaken to counter the up-
ward pressure on interest rates being generated by
growing Federal government budget deficits and
other large demands for credit. The stock of money
in the economy was increased at a 5 per cent average
annual rate from 1964 to 1968, markedly faster than
the 2 per cent average rate of rise of money in the
previous eight years. In the short run of a few months,
increased monetary expansion did help to hold inter-
est rates down by increasing the supply of loan funds.
In the longer run, however, the faster rate of money
growth stimulated total spending and price increases
and thereby the demand for credit. The overall re-
sult was pronounced increases in interest rates.
The tax surcharge and the program of reduced
Federal Covernment expenditure growth adopted in
mid-1968 were designed to curb inflation but proved
to have much less effect than had been intended.
The growth of total spending was not slowed by the
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fiscal actions, and the rate of inflation continued to
accelerate. The acceleration of price rises was fa-
cilitated by stimulative monetary actions as the stock
of money continued to grow at a 7 per cent rate from
June 1968 to January 1969, following a trend set in
early 1967.
Monetary policy moved toward moderate restraint
early in 1969, with money stock growth at a reduced
4 per cent annual rate from January to June. Mone-
tary influence became much more restrictive about
mid-1969 — the stock of money remained essentially
unchanged through the last half of 1969. As yet, there
has been no abatement of inflation, however, as the
impact of the monetary restraint has fallen initially
on real economic activity.
Once prices have risen in response to excess de-
tnand, actions taken to moderate total spending ini-
tially reduce production and have but a delayed effect
on prices. In the current situation, inflation was al-
lo~vedto accelerate for four years before effective
restraint was exercised. The longer inflation is allowed
to continue, the more resistant it becomes to stabiliza-
tion actions. Inflation becomes a major factor in ex-
pectations and planning, and is written into wages
and other contracts, incorporated into interest rates,
and considered in revenue forecasts of investors.
What is often called “cost-push” inflation in our
economy today is more accurately the delayed effects
of past excessive spending. For example the wage in-
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creases demanded by labor during recent years, cited
as one of the primary factors in pushing up prices,
actually reflect, in part, the increasing costs of living
experienced in the past few years.1 Average hourly
wages in manufacturing increased at a 6 per cent
annual rate during 1969 but, due to inflation, actual
purchasing power of hourly wages was about un-
changed. It is this experience which has caused
labor to seek wage increases in excess of gains in
productivity. These negotiated wage increases ap-
pear as increases in unit labor costs and consequently
are assumed by some observers to be the cause of
inflation. Unit labor costs in manufacturing have been
increasing rapidly since mid-1965, However, these
costs did not begin to rise sharply until more than
a year after prices of industrial commodities began
to increase. These “cost-push” factors are a part of
the inflationary process and act to further inflation
once it has begun. They are more a symptom of de-
mand inflation than an independent influence.
The restrictive monetary action inaugurated early
in 1969 and intensified at mid-year resulted in a
slowdown of total spending late in the year. Total
spending increased at a 4 per cent annual rate from
the third to the fourth quarter, down from an 8 per
cent rate of increase during the previous two years.
The growth of total spending declined further in the
first quarter of this year.
Virtually all of the recent moderation in total
spending resulted in slowing of real product growth.
Real output decreased slightly from the third to the
fourth quarter and is expected to show a significant
decline in the first quarter. Industrial production has
decreased at a 5 per cent annual rate since last July,
compared \vith a 5.7 per cent annual rate of increase
over the previous two years.
Along with the moderation of production, growth
of employment has declined. Payroll employnient,
which had expanded at a 3.4 per cent annual rate
from mid-1967 to mid-1969, increased at a 1.5 per
cent rate from June to October and since October it
has increased at a 1.3 per cent rate. Employment in
manufacturing has declined sharply since last sum-
mer, and the average workweek of those employed
has been reduced by almost one hour since late last
year. Unemployment has risen since year-end, and
reached 4.4 per cent of the labor force in March,
higher than the 3.7 per cent average rate of the 1966-
1969 period, but still well below the 5.5 per cent
average from 1961 to 1965.
t
See Albert E. Burger, “The Effects of Inflation (1960-68)”,
this Review, Noveniber 1969, pp. 25-36.
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Personal income grew at a 5.4 per cent rate from
August to Febrnary, after rising at a 9 per cent rate
in the previous year. Since the rate of increase of
prices has not slowed, the reduced growth of income
represents very little gain in purchasing power. Real
personal income, which had increased at a 5 per cent
rate from late 1967 to the fall of last year, has since
increased at about a 1 per cent annual rate.
The pattern of total spending, real economic activ-
ity, and prices in the second quarter of this year has
been essentially deterniined by stabilization actions
already taken. Evaluation of the probable path of the
economy, including prices, through the rest of the
year depends on consideration of most recent and
prospective monetary and fiscal actions,
The major contribution of fiscal policy to the cur-
rent anti-inflation programs has been a sharp reduc-
tion in net borrowing by the Federal Government.
Large and growing deficits in the 1965-68 period were
accompanied by rapid money creation, as the Federal
Reserve undenvrote much of the newly-created Fed-
eral debt. Since late 1968 the Federal budget has
generally been in surplus, and the upward pressure on
the money stock of large Federal Government financ-
ing requirements has been removed. As presented in
January, the Government’s official budget plan for the
fiscal year which begins July 1 indicates a surplus of
$1.3 billion, about the same as the $1.5 billion surplus
expected in this fiscal year. The budget is subject to
change, however, and items such as the recently pro-
posed postal pay increase could reduce the expected
surplus.
Through early February there had been no signif-
icant shift in the influence of monetary actions on
the economy. The sharp increase in the stock of
money in late December was due primarily to tech-
nical factors and was offset by a large decline during
January. Since early February money has been gro’v-
ing, but the period is still too short to determine
whether this is another irregular movement or the
beginning of a new trend. If maintained, however,
growth of money would tend to provide some stimu-
lus to economic activity late this year.
The declines in interest rates experienced since
December apparently reflect reductions in the de-
mand for credit and cannot be interpreted as indica-
tive of a change in the basic impact of monetary
actions. Most of the rise in interest rates from 1966 to
1969 was due to rising expectations of inflation as
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both lenders and borrowers came to expect the value
of money to decline. The recent declines in rates
have probably been due to the reaction of these
market expectations to the signs of increasing weak-
ness in the economy.
Short-term interest rates have declined sharply
since early in the year, falling to about the levels of
last spring. The market yield on Treasury bills fell
from 8.02 per cent in early January to 6.40 per cent
in early April. In the spring of last year these bills
yielded an average of 6.20 per cent. The interest
rate on commercial paper stood at 8.10 per cent in
early April, down from an average of 9 per cent
early in the year, but above the average 7.55 per
cent rate in the spring of last year. Short-term rates
in general remain high relative to previous years.
The yield on Treasury bills averaged 5.33 per cent
in 1968 and 4.30 per cent in 1967. The interest rate
on commercial paper averaged 5.90 per cent in 1968
and 5.10 per cent in 1967.
Long-term interest rates have not shown the marked
declines experienced in the short-term market. The
yield on corporate Aaa-rated bonds was 7.85 per cent
in earlyApril, slightly lower than the January average.
Corporate Aaa bonds yielded an average 6.90 per
cent last spring, 6.18 per cent in 1968, and 5.51 per
cent in 1967.
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The current slowdown in economic activity should
put downward pressure on interest rates. However,
it will probably take considerable time to reduce the
inflation premium already built into rates, especially
on long-term debt. This can only be accomplished
through a reduction in the rate of increase of prices.
In the current situation long-term interest rates prob-
ably cannot be reduced significantly by a large in-
APRIL, 1970
crease in the supply of money without a serious risk
of further stimulating inflation and causing rates to
rise to even higher levels later on.
Research conducted at this Bank (pages 7-25 of
this Review) suggests that monetary actions have
their major affect on total spending after about two
quarters. Accordingly, the policy of monetary re-
straint in the last six months of 1969 is likely to have
a significant impact on total spending through this
summer. Because of the momentum of inflation, most
of the impact of this restraint will probably continue
to be on production and employment. More and
more of the lagged effect of monetary restraint should
fall on prices, as continued rapid price increases be-
come progressively difficult to maintain in the face of
a slowdown in income, spending, and employment.
The magnitude and duration of the excessive total
spending and inflation in the 1964-69 period have
precluded a swift and painless moderation of the
rapid rate of price increases. The pressure of acceler-
ating inflation of the last few years is still a strong
force pushing upward on current prices, and this effect
will have to be overcome first. The restrictive mone~
tary and fiscal actions of the past year have slowed
spending, production and income growth, and further
slowing is probable. The current inflation is stubborn
and cannot be eased quickly, but some moderation
in the rate at which prices are increasing is likely
later this year.
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TRUTH-IN-LENDING FILMSTRIP
A 20-minute filmstrip on the Truth-In-Lending law and Regulation Z has
been made available by the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System.
This new filmstrip, and an earlier film intended for creditors, may be borrowed
free of charge from the Bank Relations and Public Information Department of
the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis.
The filmstrips are designed to be used with a Dukane or similar projector
which simultaneously views the 35mm film and plays a 33½RPM record. Film
changing is synchronized with the narration. The projector is not furnished with
the filmstrip, but it is understood that such equipment is widely available.
When submitting requests for the filmstrip, please indicate the date desired
with alternates and the approximate number of the expected audience, Copies
of an infonnative booklet for consumers, entitled “What Truth-In-Lending
Means To You,” wifi accompany the filmstrip.
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